The tension over United Kingdom's departure from European Union (EU) has been on way since Theresa May government published its White Paper on day 12 in favour of a soft Brexit.
In British political scene, friction is severe, following resignations of hard Brexiteros leaders (David Davis and Boris Johnson). And with parliamentary clashes that evidence May's substantive weakness, as well as difficulty of arming an alternative.
On part of twenty-seven, negotiating cohesion has been imposed on some isolated attempt (of German Interior minister, Unauthorized) to look for individual ventajismos. It is a much more valuable tune as union exhibits at same time intense fractures in or areas (immigration, budgets).
The negotiating team has not directly rejected white paper, although its philosophy of segmenting four Community liberties: Movement of goods, services, people and capital. It avoids to carry with sanbenito of being he who hinders or precludes advances.
But instead it has pointed out without ambages those elements that make it impossible to implement, not so much by will, but by practical unfeasibility: Norrn Ireland and financial services. Two transcendental matters for London, because sovereign unity of Kingdom is played in m (in exchange for recovery of a pseudosoberanía delivered to EU) and jewel of crown of its economy.
Brussels considers quite rightly as not feasible type of control (technologically is to be devised) that London intends to impose on Ulster border, instead of a hard frontier, which everyone claims to reject and that would fundamentally harm all Irish, south and north. The 27, although with nuances, prefers United Kingdom within Union, but not partly attached to internal market and obliquely to its customs union. In absence of total freedom of movement, a permeable frontier would threaten to become a crop of corrupt and illegal traffic and would end up an irreversible blow to European market itself.
In past, Ulster would not be desgajara of that market, but that questioned unity of United Kingdom. Both British pretensions, access to internal market, although only in agricultural goods and products (not in fishing), and at same time not being in it, are contradictory and unviable. Anor is case with services (not always detachable from manufactures), 80% of British economy. London's claim to cogovern that area through reinforced equivalencies is opposition of 27, for similar reasons. Which would lead to City being most harmed by Brexit.
Europe does not seek to punish United Kingdom. You don't even want a hard Brexit. Not a divorce without agreement, of high prejudice: 1.5% of its GDP, estimates IMF. But it would be even worse a pact that would destroy its achievements and its internal cohesion. Therefore he cannot make concessions that favor pecking in areas to which he belongs, combined with waste of ors, less palatable. or any privilege that might stimulate some or partner — at moment, none — toward separatist adventure.
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