This has been, first of all, 30-year Congress, which adds two-stage plan in which China must become a rich and powerful country. This sequential lapse marks evolution of contemporary China, first with Mao, n with Deng Xiaoping. Now, Xi Jinping suggests a strategy that in an equivalent period will allow culmination of Chinese dream of modernization. In 2050, backward and weak China will turn page and that transformation focus it to a hegemonic position at global level for more than Beijing rejects any purpose of that nature. It will not only be an economic primacy but will have a growing reflex in all spheres of world power. And if powers of West do not make a dent, she will do it without hesitation.
If Communist Party does not have guaranteed per se its hegemony, as Xi himself said on one occasion, emphasis placed on this appointment to discipline it to maximum and to guarantee not only its neatness but perseverance in observation of path plotted, confers a Singular will to conjure up any challenge to his leadership. That rich and powerful China does not intend to be nor will it be liberal; What's more, it is expected in next decade an intense re-ideologization in most classic and traditional terms, discarding any relinquishment to its original oretical foundations. The global assertion of Chinese success will come from hand of a reiteration that this has been possible not in application of recipes of liberalism but of a national response based on a Marxism that flourishes again in official speeches.
Finally, Xi Jinping secured an undeniable position within party by a double track. First, institutionalizing "Xiísmo" as an ideological guide for third time that country will live in coming years. Second, blurring Clánicas fidelity and establishing a unique recognizable loyalty. It did not need subterfuge as argue a party presidency or even insinuate a presidency of Central military commission beyond culmination of its second term. The composition of Standing Committee of Political Bureau clears obstacles and facilitates implementation of its programme without need to attend to internal machinations.
By presiding over a second transition without definite succession, Xi Jinping will receive applause of those who believe that China needs not a strong leader but of iron to lead last and complex stretch of modernization. On contrary, re will be no shortage of concern in those, mainly those born from Eighties, who harbor fear that announced closing of ranks makes unbreathable an atmosphere in which, despite ir limits, y had enjoyed small Margins of freedom.
Xulio Ríos is director of Chinese Policy Observatory and author of modern China.